Introduction Introduction
In 1966, Harvey Leibenstein published an intriguing article called "Allocative In 1966, Harvey Leibenstein published an intriguing article called "Allocative Effi ciency vs. X-Effi ciency" in the Effi ciency vs. X-Effi ciency" in the American Economic Review, questioning whether , questioning whether market forces could be assumed to ensure allocative effi ciency. To make his case, market forces could be assumed to ensure allocative effi ciency. To make his case, Leibenstein reported on a number of descriptive studies, which cast doubt upon Leibenstein reported on a number of descriptive studies, which cast doubt upon allocative effi ciency. allocative effi ciency.
Leibenstein pointed to theoretical studies, which, in contrast to the empirical Leibenstein pointed to theoretical studies, which, in contrast to the empirical literature, suggested that deviations from allocative effi ciency were trivial. The most literature, suggested that deviations from allocative effi ciency were trivial. The most infl uential of these studies was Arnold Harberger's (1954) article, "Monopoly and infl uential of these studies was Arnold Harberger's (1954) article, "Monopoly and Resource Allocation." According to Harberger's calculation, the complete eliminaResource Allocation." According to Harberger's calculation, the complete elimination of monopoly in the United States would raise national income by only tion of monopoly in the United States would raise national income by only 1 1 ⁄ ⁄13 13 of of 1 percent, no more than a trivial rounding error. Using tools that would be appro-1 percent, no more than a trivial rounding error. Using tools that would be appropriate for an undergraduate economics class, Harberger (1954) produced a supply priate for an undergraduate economics class, Harberger (1954) produced a supply and demand diagram in which monopolistic power shifted the supply curve upward. and demand diagram in which monopolistic power shifted the supply curve upward. Harberger then measured the welfare losses from monopoly with a small triangle Harberger then measured the welfare losses from monopoly with a small triangle formed by a vertical line drawn from the new intersection of the supply and the formed by a vertical line drawn from the new intersection of the supply and the demand curve to the old supply curve. Harberger (1959) returned to this idea fi ve demand curve to the old supply curve. Harberger (1959) returned to this idea fi ve years later, suggesting that removing distortions in Chile's economy would produce years later, suggesting that removing distortions in Chile's economy would produce a relatively insignifi cant improvement in economic performance. Harberger's a relatively insignifi cant improvement in economic performance. Harberger's article continues to be quite infl uential. Although economists had used this kind article continues to be quite infl uential. Although economists had used this kind of diagram for more than a century (as discussed in this journal by Hines, 1999) , of diagram for more than a century (as discussed in this journal by Hines, 1999) , nobody before had tried to apply it empirically. The "Harberger triangle" diagram nobody before had tried to apply it empirically. The "Harberger triangle" diagram is a wonderful demonstration of the power of straightforward price theory to is a wonderful demonstration of the power of straightforward price theory to produce strikingly counterintuitive results. Many of the popular disputes regarding produce strikingly counterintuitive results. Many of the popular disputes regarding monopolies revolve around their capacity to redistribute income at the expense monopolies revolve around their capacity to redistribute income at the expense of consumers. In contrast, Harberger measured total welfare, without taking into of consumers. In contrast, Harberger measured total welfare, without taking into account the distributional effects of monopoly, explicitly dismissing any concern account the distributional effects of monopoly, explicitly dismissing any concern about distribution as metaphysical (Harberger, 1954, p. 87) . about distribution as metaphysical (Harberger, 1954, p. 87) . Leibenstein (1966) did not take issue with Harberger in this regard; instead, he Leibenstein (1966) did not take issue with Harberger in this regard; instead, he suggested that deeper fundamental problems lurked within Harberger's model. He suggested that deeper fundamental problems lurked within Harberger's model. He began by pointing out that the design of Harberger's model prevented monopoly began by pointing out that the design of Harberger's model prevented monopoly from affecting economic welfare. Even if monopolies controlled half the economy from affecting economic welfare. Even if monopolies controlled half the economy and were able to increase prices by 20 percent, assuming the elasticity of demand as and were able to increase prices by 20 percent, assuming the elasticity of demand as 1.5, the resulting welfare loss would be a mere 1.5 percent. 1.5, the resulting welfare loss would be a mere 1.5 percent.
But whether Harberger's method ruled out any signifi cant effects of monopoly But whether Harberger's method ruled out any signifi cant effects of monopoly on welfare was beside the point for Leibenstein, who focused on a more serious on welfare was beside the point for Leibenstein, who focused on a more serious defect in Harberger's approach. In estimating the consequences of monopolies' defect in Harberger's approach. In estimating the consequences of monopolies' ability to raise prices, Harberger assumed that all production was carried on effiability to raise prices, Harberger assumed that all production was carried on efficiently, regardless of the structure of the economy. Leibenstein insisted that absent ciently, regardless of the structure of the economy. Leibenstein insisted that absent strong competitive pressure, fi rms are unlikely to use their resources effi ciently. strong competitive pressure, fi rms are unlikely to use their resources effi ciently. For this reason, monopolies are destructive of social welfare because of a weakened For this reason, monopolies are destructive of social welfare because of a weakened incentive to minimize costs. Leibenstein, of course, was attacking a fundamental incentive to minimize costs. Leibenstein, of course, was attacking a fundamental economic assumption: that fi rms minimize costs. In effect, Leibenstein was economic assumption: that fi rms minimize costs. In effect, Leibenstein was proposing a different theory, in which economists would pay attention to the gap proposing a different theory, in which economists would pay attention to the gap between ideal allocative effi ciency and actually existing effi ciency, a gap he called between ideal allocative effi ciency and actually existing effi ciency, a gap he called "X-ineffi ciency." "X-ineffi ciency." Leibenstein (1966) knew that he was not providing a formal theory or empirical Leibenstein (1966) knew that he was not providing a formal theory or empirical proof of the existence of X-ineffi ciency. Nonetheless, he was confi dent that he was proof of the existence of X-ineffi ciency. Nonetheless, he was confi dent that he was identifying a powerful force that economic theory had not yet addressed. In naming identifying a powerful force that economic theory had not yet addressed. In naming this force, Leibenstein took his cue from a passage in Leo Tolstoy's this force, Leibenstein took his cue from a passage in Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace, , which contained the observation, "Two armies may be identical in every observwhich contained the observation, "Two armies may be identical in every observable respect . . . , yet one army, in possession of an intangible 'X-factor,' will soundly able respect . . . , yet one army, in possession of an intangible 'X-factor,' will soundly defeat the other" (as quoted in Leibenstein, 1976, p. vii) . Following Tolstoy's lead, defeat the other" (as quoted in Leibenstein, 1976, p. vii) . Following Tolstoy's lead, Leibenstein introduced the concept of "X-effi ciency." He modestly offered what he Leibenstein introduced the concept of "X-effi ciency." He modestly offered what he called "spotty evidence," which he still considered "suffi ciently persuasive to suggest called "spotty evidence," which he still considered "suffi ciently persuasive to suggest the possibility that X-effi ciency exists, and that it frequently is much more signifithe possibility that X-effi ciency exists, and that it frequently is much more significant than allocational effi ciency" (Leibenstein, 1966, p. 398 ). Leibenstein realized: cant than allocational effi ciency" (Leibenstein, 1966, p. 398 ). Leibenstein realized: "Most of the evidence has to do with specifi c fi rms or, at best, industries, and not for "Most of the evidence has to do with specifi c fi rms or, at best, industries, and not for the economy as a whole" (p. 399). the economy as a whole" (p. 399).
Leibenstein's Spotty Evidence Leibenstein's Spotty Evidence
In a sense, Leibenstein had not discovered anything new. Many economists In a sense, Leibenstein had not discovered anything new. Many economists already understood that fi rms, shielded from competition, will not be effi cient. For already understood that fi rms, shielded from competition, will not be effi cient. For example, Adam Smith (1776 Smith ( [1970 , b. I, ch. 11, p. 163) observed, "monopoly . . . example, Adam Smith (1776 [1970 , b. I, ch. 11, p. 163) observed, "monopoly . . . is a great enemy to good management." Similarly, Alfred Marshall (1888 Marshall ( [1926 , is a great enemy to good management." Similarly, Alfred Marshall (1888 Marshall ( [1926 , p. 92) observed that business might not bother to maximize productivity until hard p. 92) observed that business might not bother to maximize productivity until hard times come, when "manufacturers are put on their mettle and exert themselves to times come, when "manufacturers are put on their mettle and exert themselves to the utmost to invent improved methods and to avail themselves of the improvethe utmost to invent improved methods and to avail themselves of the improvements made by others." ments made by others."
In addition, various empirical subdisciplines of economics offer frequent confi rIn addition, various empirical subdisciplines of economics offer frequent confi rmations of X-effi ciency. One need only look at a textbook on industrial organization to mations of X-effi ciency. One need only look at a textbook on industrial organization to read about a host of studies that document symptoms of X-ineffi ciency (for example, read about a host of studies that document symptoms of X-ineffi ciency (for example, Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 668-72) . One indication is that management seems to Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 668-72) . One indication is that management seems to be able to ramp up effi ciency quickly in response to the shock of new competition be able to ramp up effi ciency quickly in response to the shock of new competition (p. 669). Borenstein and Farrell (2000) analyzed the rash of cost-cutting announce-(p. 669). Borenstein and Farrell (2000) analyzed the rash of cost-cutting announcements in the petroleum industry in the wake of the 1986 oil price crash. The ability to ments in the petroleum industry in the wake of the 1986 oil price crash. The ability to make such sudden adjustments was symptomatic of an industry where X-ineffi ciency make such sudden adjustments was symptomatic of an industry where X-ineffi ciency had been endemic. On a more macroeconomic scale, Field (2003) found evidence had been endemic. On a more macroeconomic scale, Field (2003) found evidence that the years of the Great Depression made up the most technologically progressive that the years of the Great Depression made up the most technologically progressive period in U.S. history. Presumably, a previous laxity in cost cutting must have played period in U.S. history. Presumably, a previous laxity in cost cutting must have played a role. A similar analysis was common among institutionalist economists who argued a role. A similar analysis was common among institutionalist economists who argued that higher wages can "shock" managers to increase effi ciency. Similarly, higher that higher wages can "shock" managers to increase effi ciency. Similarly, higher resource costs can shock fi rms to improve their performance (Porter and van der resource costs can shock fi rms to improve their performance (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Perelman, 1999, ch. 7) . Linde, 1995; Perelman, 1999, ch. 7) . Finally, the historical literature on large oligopolistic corporations provides Finally, the historical literature on large oligopolistic corporations provides substantial detail about managerial slack-U.S. Steel was a favorite example. No substantial detail about managerial slack-U.S. Steel was a favorite example. No doubt the fate of the U.S. automobile industry will supply fodder for such studies in doubt the fate of the U.S. automobile industry will supply fodder for such studies in the future. The business press routinely discusses how some fi rms lag behind because the future. The business press routinely discusses how some fi rms lag behind because of gross ineffi ciency and how other fi rms surge ahead by becoming more effi cient. of gross ineffi ciency and how other fi rms surge ahead by becoming more effi cient. Leibenstein (1966) offered his own catalogue of evidence of X-ineffi ciency. Leibenstein (1966) offered his own catalogue of evidence of X-ineffi ciency. He reported on studies of "largely identical" factories in Britain and the United He reported on studies of "largely identical" factories in Britain and the United States that showed substantial differences in productivity. One Egyptian oil refi nery States that showed substantial differences in productivity. One Egyptian oil refi nery had half the productivity of another one less than a half mile away. After many had half the productivity of another one less than a half mile away. After many years of stagnation, management changed and the refi nery suddenly managed years of stagnation, management changed and the refi nery suddenly managed "quite spectacular improvements in effi ciency with the same labor force." Inter-"quite spectacular improvements in effi ciency with the same labor force." International comparisons of the dissimilar performance of comparable plants offered national comparisons of the dissimilar performance of comparable plants offered further confi rmation of X-ineffi ciency. Leibenstein also included studies reporting further confi rmation of X-ineffi ciency. Leibenstein also included studies reporting on a reluctance to invest in equipment or research in the absence of competitive on a reluctance to invest in equipment or research in the absence of competitive pressures. His summary of the International Labour Organization's "productivity pressures. His summary of the International Labour Organization's "productivity missions" found a large number of cases in which simple reorganization of producmissions" found a large number of cases in which simple reorganization of production methods produced large savings, frequently above 25 percent. Reports of the tion methods produced large savings, frequently above 25 percent. Reports of the effects of British consulting services suggested similar results. effects of British consulting services suggested similar results. Leibenstein's (1966) catalogue of evidence also included various studies of Leibenstein's (1966) catalogue of evidence also included various studies of how poor labor management relations, incentive systems, selection of workers, or how poor labor management relations, incentive systems, selection of workers, or excessive hours of work created ineffi ciencies. In addition, he divided the causes excessive hours of work created ineffi ciencies. In addition, he divided the causes of X-ineffi ciency into three elements: (1) intra-plant motivational effi ciency, of X-ineffi ciency into three elements: (1) intra-plant motivational effi ciency, (2) external motivational effi ciency, and (3) nonmarket input effi ciency. He further (2) external motivational effi ciency, and (3) nonmarket input effi ciency. He further offered four reasons why the production function is indeterminate: (1) contracts offered four reasons why the production function is indeterminate: (1) contracts for labor are incomplete, (2) not all factors of production are marketed, (3) the for labor are incomplete, (2) not all factors of production are marketed, (3) the production function is not completely specifi ed or known, and (4) interdepenproduction function is not completely specifi ed or known, and (4) interdependence and uncertainty lead competing fi rms to cooperate tacitly with each other in dence and uncertainty lead competing fi rms to cooperate tacitly with each other in some respects and to imitate each other with respect to technique to some degree. some respects and to imitate each other with respect to technique to some degree. Leibenstein identifi ed X-ineffi ciency with Robert Solow's (1957) unexplained Leibenstein identifi ed X-ineffi ciency with Robert Solow's (1957) unexplained residual and the results of other efforts to construct growth equations. He also residual and the results of other efforts to construct growth equations. He also included two graphs and references to production possibility surfaces, suggesting included two graphs and references to production possibility surfaces, suggesting that he might be attempting to integrate his theory into the mainstream of economic that he might be attempting to integrate his theory into the mainstream of economic thought. Nonetheless, his categories all revolve around matters of behavior. For thought. Nonetheless, his categories all revolve around matters of behavior. For example, Leibenstein uses "trustworthiness" as an example of a nonmarketed input. example, Leibenstein uses "trustworthiness" as an example of a nonmarketed input.
In effect, Leibenstein was chipping away at abstract price theory by reminding In effect, Leibenstein was chipping away at abstract price theory by reminding economists of the importance of the principal-agent problem in which both economists of the importance of the principal-agent problem in which both management and labor lack the motivation to maximize fi rm effi ciency. management and labor lack the motivation to maximize fi rm effi ciency. Harberger's (1954) work raised tricky policy questions. Harberger estimated Harberger's (1954) work raised tricky policy questions. Harberger estimated that, according to his method, the corporate income tax also had a relatively trivial that, according to his method, the corporate income tax also had a relatively trivial impact on economic welfare, even though it was still fi ve times as great as the effect impact on economic welfare, even though it was still fi ve times as great as the effect of monopolistic practices (Hines, 1999, p. 179) . If neither monopoly nor the corpoof monopolistic practices (Hines, 1999, p. 179) . If neither monopoly nor the corporate tax rate had much effect on social welfare, the same reasoning would suggest rate tax rate had much effect on social welfare, the same reasoning would suggest that intrusive regulatory policies would be equally inconsequential. Some conservathat intrusive regulatory policies would be equally inconsequential. Some conservatives were concerned about the theory's implication that tampering with markets tives were concerned about the theory's implication that tampering with markets would do little harm. Future Nobel laureate Robert Mundell (1962, p. 622) worried would do little harm. Future Nobel laureate Robert Mundell (1962, p. 622) worried that if distortions did so little damage, "someone inevitably will draw the conclusion that if distortions did so little damage, "someone inevitably will draw the conclusion that economics has ceased to be important!" Along this line, in his discussion of that economics has ceased to be important!" Along this line, in his discussion of Harberger triangles in this journal, Hines (1999, p. 183) hints that the literature on Harberger triangles in this journal, Hines (1999, p. 183) hints that the literature on rent seeking might have been a delayed response to Harberger's article. rent seeking might have been a delayed response to Harberger's article. Harberger's (1954) brilliant display of applied price theory also inadvertently Harberger's (1954) Any economics student can expatiate on the inequities, distortions, and allocation of ineffi ciencies of controls or guideposts or tax rewards and penalties. But just consider the alternative. The microeconomic distortions of incomes policies would be trivial compared to the macroeconomic costs of prolonged underemployment of labor and capital. It takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fi ll an Okun Gap.
Challenges to Harberger Challenges to Harberger
Jaroslav Vanek (1989, p. 93) , went further in commenting on the respecJaroslav Vanek (1989, p. 93) , went further in commenting on the respective dimensions of Harberger's triangles, Tobin's Okun gaps, and X-ineffi ciency, tive dimensions of Harberger's triangles, Tobin's Okun gaps, and X-ineffi ciency, comparing them to "fl eas, rabbits and elephants," respectively. comparing them to "fl eas, rabbits and elephants," respectively.
Leibenstein was not entirely clear at the time of his 1966 article in articulating Leibenstein was not entirely clear at the time of his 1966 article in articulating the magnitude of the social costs of X-effi ciency, but in a later defense of his work, the magnitude of the social costs of X-effi ciency, but in a later defense of his work, he noted that in "the absence of pressures to contain costs there is a general cost he noted that in "the absence of pressures to contain costs there is a general cost rising tendency, in part because of a failure to take advantage of new techniques of rising tendency, in part because of a failure to take advantage of new techniques of cost containment" (Leibenstein, 1978, p. 205) . Thus, even though the immediate cost containment" (Leibenstein, 1978, p. 205) . Thus, even though the immediate effect of X-ineffi ciency might be small, an accumulating degree of X-ineffi ciency effect of X-ineffi ciency might be small, an accumulating degree of X-ineffi ciency will take an ever larger toll on productivity over time. will take an ever larger toll on productivity over time.
Leibenstein's Challenge to Economic Theory Leibenstein's Challenge to Economic Theory
Had Leibenstein (1966) only published a survey of the literature on deviations Had Leibenstein (1966) only published a survey of the literature on deviations from cost minimization, his analysis would have been unremarkable. He admitted from cost minimization, his analysis would have been unremarkable. He admitted that readers might be inclined to dismiss reports of individual studies as nothing more that readers might be inclined to dismiss reports of individual studies as nothing more than curious but atypical anecdotes (p. 399). Besides, similar stories had existed side than curious but atypical anecdotes (p. 399). Besides, similar stories had existed side by side with classical price theory for many decades without much interaction between by side with classical price theory for many decades without much interaction between these two lines of research. However, Leibenstein suggested that the phenomenon of these two lines of research. However, Leibenstein suggested that the phenomenon of deviations from cost minimization is pervasive. This claim posed a serious challenge deviations from cost minimization is pervasive. This claim posed a serious challenge for price theory, the cornerstone of microeconomics. Leibenstein went further, calling for price theory, the cornerstone of microeconomics. Leibenstein went further, calling for the creation of a theory of the fi rm without the assumption of cost minimization. for the creation of a theory of the fi rm without the assumption of cost minimization.
Leibenstein was an unlikely rebel. Unlike Harberger, who began his 1954 Leibenstein was an unlikely rebel. Unlike Harberger, who began his 1954 article with a provocative statement suggesting that he intended to upend convenarticle with a provocative statement suggesting that he intended to upend conventional economic thinking about monopoly, Leibenstein's tone was modest. Indeed, tional economic thinking about monopoly, Leibenstein's tone was modest. Indeed, Leibenstein seemed to have an aversion to confl ict. He resigned from the University Leibenstein seemed to have an aversion to confl ict. He resigned from the University of California, Berkeley, repelled by the campus turmoil of the 1960s (Dean and of California, Berkeley, repelled by the campus turmoil of the 1960s (Dean and Perlman, 1998, pp. 133-34) . In a later retrospective, Leibenstein (1988 , p. xv) Perlman, 1998 . In a later retrospective, Leibenstein (1988, p. xv) seemed to shy away from the confl ict over X-effi ciency as well, almost denying any seemed to shy away from the confl ict over X-effi ciency as well, almost denying any responsibility for igniting the controversy. He recalled that he put his "underutiresponsibility for igniting the controversy. He recalled that he put his "underutilized research assistants" to work. They discovered "a number of clear-cut, empirical lized research assistants" to work. They discovered "a number of clear-cut, empirical examples of fi rms that appeared to be operating non-optimally." Because these examples of fi rms that appeared to be operating non-optimally." Because these fi ndings "contradict standard micro theory . . . I was forced by the data to reconfi ndings "contradict standard micro theory . . . I was forced by the data to reconsider my previously held positions." sider my previously held positions." Leibenstein's (1966) X-effi ciency thesis found little support from mainstream Leibenstein's (1966) X-effi ciency thesis found little support from mainstream economists. His most distinguished supporter may have been Herbert Simon, who economists. His most distinguished supporter may have been Herbert Simon, who devoted the fi nal section of his Nobel Lecture to the subject, singling out Leibendevoted the fi nal section of his Nobel Lecture to the subject, singling out Leibenstein along with Richard Cyert and James March (Simon, 1979, pp. 50-89) . Simon, stein along with Richard Cyert and James March (Simon, 1979, pp. 50-89) . Simon, however, was not committed to standard micro theory. Before Leibenstein's article however, was not committed to standard micro theory. Before Leibenstein's article appeared, Simon had largely withdrawn from the discipline of economics, having appeared, Simon had largely withdrawn from the discipline of economics, having published only three articles in the published only three articles in the American Economic Review and one in the and one in the Journal of Political Economy. . Perhaps some controversy regarding Leibenstein's challenge was inevitable, but Perhaps some controversy regarding Leibenstein's challenge was inevitable, but the X-effi ciency article created a fi restorm of criticism. Dean and Perlman (1998, the X-effi ciency article created a fi restorm of criticism. Dean and Perlman (1998, p. 141) note: "Between 1969 and 1980, the article was the third most frequently cited p. 141) note: "Between 1969 and 1980, the article was the third most frequently cited in the Social Science Citation Index. However, . . . much of this citation derived in the Social Science Citation Index. However, . . . much of this citation derived from attempts to explain X-effi ciency theory away: it was under almost constant from attempts to explain X-effi ciency theory away: it was under almost constant attack from much of the mainstream of the profession over that same dozen years." attack from much of the mainstream of the profession over that same dozen years." JSTOR's more recent references to X-effi ciency suggest that the controversy has not JSTOR's more recent references to X-effi ciency suggest that the controversy has not yet died down. yet died down.
Rescuing the Damsel of Maximization Rescuing the Damsel of Maximization
At the forefront of Leibenstein's powerful critics was George Stigler, who was At the forefront of Leibenstein's powerful critics was George Stigler, who was very protective of classical price theory. As Claire Friedland (1993, p. 780), his close very protective of classical price theory. As Claire Friedland (1993, p. 780), his close coworker, observed in a coworker, observed in a Journal of Political Economy Stigler memorial issue: "Much of his Stigler memorial issue: "Much of his work centered around saving the damsel in distress, neoclassicism, from her attackers." work centered around saving the damsel in distress, neoclassicism, from her attackers." Harold Demsetz's (1993, p. 800) contribution to the memorial issue made a similar Harold Demsetz's (1993, p. 800) contribution to the memorial issue made a similar point: "Evidence of Stigler's attachment to neoclassical price theory is also given by that point: "Evidence of Stigler's attachment to neoclassical price theory is also given by that part of his work mainly critical of the work of others. Price rigidity, administered price part of his work mainly critical of the work of others. Price rigidity, administered price infl ation, the theory of monopolistic competition, and X-effi ciency were prominent infl ation, the theory of monopolistic competition, and X-effi ciency were prominent targets, and each of them denied the effi cacy of the neoclassical analytical framework." targets, and each of them denied the effi cacy of the neoclassical analytical framework." Thomas Sowell (1993, p. 787) , an admiring student of Stigler's, used his contribution Thomas Sowell (1993, p. 787) , an admiring student of Stigler's, used his contribution to the Stigler memorial issue to liken his mentor's style of debate to a "Demolition to the Stigler memorial issue to liken his mentor's style of debate to a "Demolition Derby." Symbolic of his combative nature, Stigler (1987, p. 99 ) once captioned a Derby." Symbolic of his combative nature, Stigler (1987, p. 99) once captioned a picture of John Stuart Mill, describing him as "perhaps the fairest economist who ever picture of John Stuart Mill, describing him as "perhaps the fairest economist who ever lived: He treated other people's theories at least as respectfully as his own, a mistake no lived: He treated other people's theories at least as respectfully as his own, a mistake no other economist has repeated." Stigler was no exception in this regard. other economist has repeated." Stigler was no exception in this regard.
Stigler's longstanding battle against the theory of monopolistic competition Stigler's longstanding battle against the theory of monopolistic competition was a necessary part of the struggle to defend classical price theory. Stigler signaled was a necessary part of the struggle to defend classical price theory. Stigler signaled the importance of this effort by choosing the subject of monopolistic competition the importance of this effort by choosing the subject of monopolistic competition for both his Richard T. Ely address and two of his for both his Richard T. Ely address and two of his Five Lectures on Economic Problems (Stigler, 1949) . (Stigler, 1949) .
Stigler is commonly credited for the quip that data is not the plural of anecStigler is commonly credited for the quip that data is not the plural of anecdote. For Stigler, Leibenstein was proposing to treat the collection of anecdotes as dote. For Stigler, Leibenstein was proposing to treat the collection of anecdotes as data; pushing matters even further to the level of principle, he was proposing that data; pushing matters even further to the level of principle, he was proposing that the existence of X-ineffi ciency meant the assumption of profi t maximization had to the existence of X-ineffi ciency meant the assumption of profi t maximization had to be replaced. For that mistake, Leibenstein had to be rebuked. be replaced. For that mistake, Leibenstein had to be rebuked.
In 1939, Stigler had already laid the foundation for his future attack on the In 1939, Stigler had already laid the foundation for his future attack on the theory of X-effi ciency by demonstrating how evidence suggesting an absence of theory of X-effi ciency by demonstrating how evidence suggesting an absence of profi t maximization can be an illusion. At the time, Stigler (1939) was discussing profi t maximization can be an illusion. At the time, Stigler (1939) was discussing how fl exibility needed to be taken into consideration in understanding effi ciency. how fl exibility needed to be taken into consideration in understanding effi ciency. Without knowledge of the context, Stigler warned that a static observation of small, Without knowledge of the context, Stigler warned that a static observation of small, underutilized, high-cost plants might be taken as evidence of ineffi ciency. However, underutilized, high-cost plants might be taken as evidence of ineffi ciency. However, that conclusion might be unjustifi ed; perhaps these plants represent the most effithat conclusion might be unjustifi ed; perhaps these plants represent the most efficient method of using sunk costs to meet surges in demand, but then again they cient method of using sunk costs to meet surges in demand, but then again they may not. Perhaps the underutilized plants are just the result of an unwillingness or may not. Perhaps the underutilized plants are just the result of an unwillingness or inability to take advantage of the most effi cient technology. While Stigler's observainability to take advantage of the most effi cient technology. While Stigler's observation was that fl exibility may be a dimension of effi ciency, making that point does not tion was that fl exibility may be a dimension of effi ciency, making that point does not constitute a proof of effi ciency. constitute a proof of effi ciency.
Stigler's initial response to Leibenstein came in an article titled, "The Xistence Stigler's initial response to Leibenstein came in an article titled, "The Xistence of X-Effi ciency." Stigler (1976) explained that he felt compelled to attack because of X-Effi ciency." Stigler (1976) explained that he felt compelled to attack because "to assume that monopolists do not maximize profi ts . . . is an abandonment of "to assume that monopolists do not maximize profi ts . . . is an abandonment of formal theory, and one which we shall naturally refuse to accept until we are given formal theory, and one which we shall naturally refuse to accept until we are given a better theory." Because Leibenstein had not provided a formal theory to explain a better theory." Because Leibenstein had not provided a formal theory to explain X-ineffi ciency, his approach was unacceptable. X-ineffi ciency, his approach was unacceptable.
In his critique, Stigler (1976) dismissed Leibenstein's evidence for differential In his critique, Stigler (1976) dismissed Leibenstein's evidence for differential productivities. Firms that seem to be in the same industry may not necessarily be productivities. Firms that seem to be in the same industry may not necessarily be producing the same goods; for instance a fi rm may be producing different quality producing the same goods; for instance a fi rm may be producing different quality tomatoes or a product that requires less shipping because of advantageous locatomatoes or a product that requires less shipping because of advantageous location. Ultimately, the notion of an industry depends upon arbitrary classifi cations. tion. Ultimately, the notion of an industry depends upon arbitrary classifi cations. Cross-product competition adds a further complication to an analysis of industrial Cross-product competition adds a further complication to an analysis of industrial organization. As a result, comparisons of the performances of individual fi rms or organization. As a result, comparisons of the performances of individual fi rms or comparisons in terms of some industry standard are meaningless. Stigler insisted comparisons in terms of some industry standard are meaningless. Stigler insisted that what appears to be ineffi ciency is illusory. As in 1939, he explained how anecthat what appears to be ineffi ciency is illusory. As in 1939, he explained how anecdotal reports of X-ineffi ciency may actually be consistent with profi t maximization. dotal reports of X-ineffi ciency may actually be consistent with profi t maximization.
Just as Leibenstein's "spotty evidence" did not constitute a proof of the Just as Leibenstein's "spotty evidence" did not constitute a proof of the nonexistence of profi t maximization, Stigler could not prove the nonexistence of nonexistence of profi t maximization, Stigler could not prove the nonexistence of X-ineffi ciency. Nonetheless, Stigler would have his readers agree that every observa-X-ineffi ciency. Nonetheless, Stigler would have his readers agree that every observation purporting to be evidence of X-ineffi ciency should be dismissed as nothing tion purporting to be evidence of X-ineffi ciency should be dismissed as nothing more than a curious anecdote of no wider signifi cance. Although Stigler could more than a curious anecdote of no wider signifi cance. Although Stigler could offer reasons why such observations might possibly be misleading, he, no more offer reasons why such observations might possibly be misleading, he, no more than Leibenstein, could provide proof of his position. In the end, just as Leibenthan Leibenstein, could provide proof of his position. In the end, just as Leibenstein invoked an invisible X-force that caused the appearance of deviations from stein invoked an invisible X-force that caused the appearance of deviations from profi t maximization, Stigler relied on an equally invisible force that guaranteed the profi t maximization, Stigler relied on an equally invisible force that guaranteed the nonexistence of X-ineffi ciency. nonexistence of X-ineffi ciency. But to make his critique, Stigler (1976, p. 213 ) used a curious example to But to make his critique, Stigler (1976, p. 213 ) used a curious example to show how an illusion of X-ineffi ciency could arise. He suggested that apparently show how an illusion of X-ineffi ciency could arise. He suggested that apparently ineffi cient fi rms may be producing nonmarketed outputs, "including leisure ineffi cient fi rms may be producing nonmarketed outputs, "including leisure and health." Stigler did not mean the leisure and health of the workers, but the and health." Stigler did not mean the leisure and health of the workers, but the well-being of employers. In contrast to the theory that managerial benefi ts spur well-being of employers. In contrast to the theory that managerial benefi ts spur productivity, Stigler was suggesting that managerial benefi ts explain low producproductivity, Stigler was suggesting that managerial benefi ts explain low productivity. In terms of the conventional measure of effi ciency, the actions that raise tivity. In terms of the conventional measure of effi ciency, the actions that raise managerial utility at the expense of the fi rm do not qualitatively differ from embezmanagerial utility at the expense of the fi rm do not qualitatively differ from embezzlement. Certainly, from the perspective of a shareholder, diverting resources zlement. Certainly, from the perspective of a shareholder, diverting resources to personal use does not constitute profi t maximization-the same assumption to personal use does not constitute profi t maximization-the same assumption that Stigler set out to rescue. Stigler was undoubtedly correct that chief executive that Stigler set out to rescue. Stigler was undoubtedly correct that chief executive offi cers will sometimes take actions that trade off fi rm profi tability for their own offi cers will sometimes take actions that trade off fi rm profi tability for their own personal utility. For example, more recent research has shown that corporations personal utility. For example, more recent research has shown that corporations underperform when their CEOs excel in golf and that spending on corporate underperform when their CEOs excel in golf and that spending on corporate jets is higher when CEOs belong to country clubs far from their headquarters (as jets is higher when CEOs belong to country clubs far from their headquarters (as summarized in Perelman, 2007, p. 9) . summarized in Perelman, 2007, p. 9 ).
Stigler's dismissal of Leibenstein's evidence may be taken as an example of what Stigler's dismissal of Leibenstein's evidence may be taken as an example of what Reder (1982) described as a stubborn adherence to the "tight priors" of neoclassical Reder (1982) described as a stubborn adherence to the "tight priors" of neoclassical economics-a key feature of Chicago economics at the time. Central to this package economics-a key feature of Chicago economics at the time. Central to this package of tight priors was the belief that because fi rms optimize, competitive forces, left to of tight priors was the belief that because fi rms optimize, competitive forces, left to themselves, would ensure optimal outcomes. Displacing tight priors to the satisfacthemselves, would ensure optimal outcomes. Displacing tight priors to the satisfaction of their adherents is virtually impossible. One of Stigler's collaborators, James tion of their adherents is virtually impossible. One of Stigler's collaborators, James Kindahl, described the strength of his resistance to evidence in a 1997 interview with Kindahl, described the strength of his resistance to evidence in a 1997 interview with Craig Freedman: "[I]f someone holds a view it cannot be dislodged by any conceivable Craig Freedman: "[I]f someone holds a view it cannot be dislodged by any conceivable empirical data. Evidence from a data system doesn't convince them. These people empirical data. Evidence from a data system doesn't convince them. These people have made their decisions already. They've become true believers and no amount of have made their decisions already. They've become true believers and no amount of empirical evidence will ever convince them by defi nition" (Freedman, 2008) . empirical evidence will ever convince them by defi nition" (Freedman, 2008) .
Classical price theory is built around the assumption that markets are effi cient Classical price theory is built around the assumption that markets are effi cient because prices provide accurate information about consumers' needs and that because prices provide accurate information about consumers' needs and that competitive pressures force business to use this information to fi nd the most costcompetitive pressures force business to use this information to fi nd the most costeffi cient way to provide for those needs. According to this approach, subjectivity, effi cient way to provide for those needs. According to this approach, subjectivity, including managerial utility, exists only in so far as it can be inferred by preferences including managerial utility, exists only in so far as it can be inferred by preferences revealed in marketplace transactions. For example, Dierdre McCloskey (1994, p. 14) revealed in marketplace transactions. For example, Dierdre McCloskey (1994, p. 14) described Stigler reprimanding someone who strayed from this practice by "declaring described Stigler reprimanding someone who strayed from this practice by "declaring loudly that all that mattered were the observable implications." The managerial loudly that all that mattered were the observable implications." The managerial welfare invoked by Stigler in his 1976 critique, of course, is not observable. welfare invoked by Stigler in his 1976 critique, of course, is not observable.
Most economists have been scrupulous in excluding questions of utility from Most economists have been scrupulous in excluding questions of utility from the productive side of the economy. Economists who strayed from this practice by the productive side of the economy. Economists who strayed from this practice by suggesting that the utility or disutility of work was worthy of consideration received suggesting that the utility or disutility of work was worthy of consideration received harsh rebukes (Perelman, 2011 ). For example, Frank Knight (1921 was harsh rebukes (Perelman, 2011 ). For example, Frank Knight (1921 We have no concern with the pains or subjective sacrifi ces involved in production, since it is not at all in terms of such "costs" that the entrepreneur makes his calculations on the basis of which he decides whether to produce the good or on what scale. He takes account of sentimental costs only in so far as they infl uence the outlays he must make to secure the services necessary to production. That is, he is concerned only with the price measure of his costs. Their magnitude in some other aspect will not infl uence his decision. Pains and sentimental repugnancies are undoubtedly infl uences in limiting the supply of some sorts of services and raising their price, but in the aggregate they form a relatively unimportant element, and no one now contends that there is any tendency for the prices of productive services, still less of fi nal goods, to bear any correspondence with these magnitudes. The relation between them is a separate inquiry, pertinent perhaps to an evaluation or criticism of the competitive economic order, hardly so to an explanation of its workings.
Stigler's appeal to managerial utility suggested how far he was willing to go to Stigler's appeal to managerial utility suggested how far he was willing to go to save the core of classical price theory-profi t maximization. In this fi ght against the save the core of classical price theory-profi t maximization. In this fi ght against the idea of X-ineffi ciency, he was willing to make a signifi cant concession by including idea of X-ineffi ciency, he was willing to make a signifi cant concession by including nonmarketed managerial welfare in an effort to win the greater battle. nonmarketed managerial welfare in an effort to win the greater battle.
Leibenstein was bound to fail in his challenge of the tight prior of cost miniLeibenstein was bound to fail in his challenge of the tight prior of cost minimization. No amount of evidence would constitute a satisfactory proof. Yet Stigler's mization. No amount of evidence would constitute a satisfactory proof. Yet Stigler's critique also fell short. Stigler could explain away each instance of X-ineffi ciency by critique also fell short. Stigler could explain away each instance of X-ineffi ciency by taking the position that nobody can scientifi cally defi ne an industry or even precisely taking the position that nobody can scientifi cally defi ne an industry or even precisely compare two different fi rms unless everything-the workforce, the location, equipcompare two different fi rms unless everything-the workforce, the location, equipment, and time frame-is absolutely identical. Of course, Stigler could not prove ment, and time frame-is absolutely identical. Of course, Stigler could not prove the nonexistence of X-ineffi ciency because of the diffi culty of proving nonexistence the nonexistence of X-ineffi ciency because of the diffi culty of proving nonexistence in general. Instead, he put the burden of proof onto Leibenstein. Stigler (1976, in general . Instead, he put the burden of proof onto Leibenstein. Stigler (1976, p. 216) concluded by slamming the door shut on anyone who might be still inclined p. 216) concluded by slamming the door shut on anyone who might be still inclined to take X-ineffi ciency seriously: "Unless one is prepared to take the mighty methto take X-ineffi ciency seriously: "Unless one is prepared to take the mighty methodological leap into the unknown that a nonmaximizing theory requires, waste is odological leap into the unknown that a nonmaximizing theory requires, waste is not a useful economic concept. Waste is error within the framework of modern not a useful economic concept. Waste is error within the framework of modern economic analysis, and it will not become a useful concept until we have a theory of economic analysis, and it will not become a useful concept until we have a theory of error." But in effect, Stigler was redefi ning anything that Leibenstein might identify error." But in effect, Stigler was redefi ning anything that Leibenstein might identify as X-ineffi ciency as something that actually conformed to neoclassical theory. as X-ineffi ciency as something that actually conformed to neoclassical theory.
Harberger's Encore Harberger's Encore
Many years after his original article, Arnold Harberger (1998a) , based on his Many years after his original article, Arnold Harberger (1998a) , based on his long career as a development economist, lent strong support to Leibenstein's anallong career as a development economist, lent strong support to Leibenstein's analysis in his presidential address to the American Economic Association. Harberger ysis in his presidential address to the American Economic Association. Harberger never mentioned Leibenstein by name, but in various places he came close to never mentioned Leibenstein by name, but in various places he came close to Leibenstein's approach. For example, Harberger (1998a, p. 1) said: "Many, maybe Leibenstein's approach. For example, Harberger (1998a, p. 1) said: "Many, maybe even most, economists expected that increments of output would be explained by even most, economists expected that increments of output would be explained by increments of inputs, but when we took our best shot we found that traditional increments of inputs, but when we took our best shot we found that traditional inputs typically fell far short of explaining the observed output growth." Elsewhere, inputs typically fell far short of explaining the observed output growth." Elsewhere, Harberger (1998b, p. 14) sounded like Tolstoy, observing "bad growth experiences Harberger (1998b, p. 14) sounded like Tolstoy, observing "bad growth experiences often sit side by side with good experiences in the same industry, as successfully often sit side by side with good experiences in the same industry, as successfully innovating fi rms in that industry thrive and expand, while their less fortunate innovating fi rms in that industry thrive and expand, while their less fortunate competitors are driven to the wall." competitors are driven to the wall."
Harberger gave numerous examples of productive improvements that fall Harberger gave numerous examples of productive improvements that fall through the usual net of economic analysis-many based on his experience in Latin through the usual net of economic analysis-many based on his experience in Latin America. In his most telling case, which might be one of the clearest examples America. In his most telling case, which might be one of the clearest examples of X-ineffi ciency, he wrote: "I recall going through a clothing plant in Central of X-ineffi ciency, he wrote: "I recall going through a clothing plant in Central America, where the owner informed me of a 20-percent reduction in real costs, America, where the owner informed me of a 20-percent reduction in real costs, following upon his installation of background music that played as the seamstresses following upon his installation of background music that played as the seamstresses worked" (Harberger, 1998a, p. 3) . Presumably, other fi rms had not yet discovered worked" (Harberger, 1998a, p. 3) . Presumably, other fi rms had not yet discovered this technique for wringing out X-ineffi ciency. Obviously, conventional price theory this technique for wringing out X-ineffi ciency. Obviously, conventional price theory could not explain why competitive pressures had not made other fi rms introduce could not explain why competitive pressures had not made other fi rms introduce music into their factories, or even search out better music that might make the music into their factories, or even search out better music that might make the seamstresses work harder and wring out X-ineffi ciency. The fact that Harberger seamstresses work harder and wring out X-ineffi ciency. The fact that Harberger situated his discussion in the context of economic growth reinforced Leibenstein's situated his discussion in the context of economic growth reinforced Leibenstein's association of X-ineffi ciency with dynamical growth models. association of X-ineffi ciency with dynamical growth models.
Conclusion Conclusion
In a reply to Stigler's (1976) critique, Leibenstein (1978) was uncharacteristiIn a reply to Stigler's (1976) critique, Leibenstein (1978) was uncharacteristically combative, identifying his attacker as an unscientifi c "Xorcist" for assuming cally combative, identifying his attacker as an unscientifi c "Xorcist" for assuming away whatever displeased him. Leibenstein condemned the "tautological interpretaaway whatever displeased him. Leibenstein condemned the "tautological interpretation," which Stigler "defends . . . on the ground that at the very least this approach tion," which Stigler "defends . . . on the ground that at the very least this approach leads to accurate predictions. However, Stigler himself does not indicate what these leads to accurate predictions. However, Stigler himself does not indicate what these predictions are" (p. 210). predictions are" (p. 210).
In this response, Leibenstein was clearer than he had been in 1966 in defi ning In this response, Leibenstein was clearer than he had been in 1966 in defi ning the causes of X-ineffi ciency as "postulates of incomplete contracts, effort discretion, the causes of X-ineffi ciency as "postulates of incomplete contracts, effort discretion, inert areas, interpersonal infl uences, and different principal-agent objectives." He inert areas, interpersonal infl uences, and different principal-agent objectives." He also went deeper in exploring the possible behavioral dimensions of X-ineffi ciency. also went deeper in exploring the possible behavioral dimensions of X-ineffi ciency. Finally, he widened the scope for X-ineffi ciency, recognizing that even in the absence Finally, he widened the scope for X-ineffi ciency, recognizing that even in the absence of monopolistic powers the phenomenon will remain to some degree (Leibenstein, of monopolistic powers the phenomenon will remain to some degree (Leibenstein, 1978 (Leibenstein, , p. 205). 1978 ).
Leibenstein's reports of differential productivities challenged economists Leibenstein's reports of differential productivities challenged economists to pay more attention to the way the production side of the economy works. For to pay more attention to the way the production side of the economy works. For Leibenstein, too many economists follow Stigler, satisfying themselves that input Leibenstein, too many economists follow Stigler, satisfying themselves that input prices and sales receipts offer suffi cient information about the nature of the underprices and sales receipts offer suffi cient information about the nature of the underlying production process. In Perelman (2011) , I survey how and why the tradition lying production process. In Perelman (2011) , I survey how and why the tradition of the discipline of economics shies away from such work. Harberger's clothing of the discipline of economics shies away from such work. Harberger's clothing plants offer an interesting example of the kind of information that fi rsthand knowlplants offer an interesting example of the kind of information that fi rsthand knowledge of the process of production might offer. Leibenstein could have pushed his edge of the process of production might offer. Leibenstein could have pushed his suggestion for research on X-ineffi ciency further. For instance, his recognition that suggestion for research on X-ineffi ciency further. For instance, his recognition that X-ineffi ciency may exist alongside competition opens the door to a Schumpeterian X-ineffi ciency may exist alongside competition opens the door to a Schumpeterian line of research, exploring the full range of the costs and benefi ts of monopolistic line of research, exploring the full range of the costs and benefi ts of monopolistic competition. Such studies might indicate that competition may involve excessive competition. Such studies might indicate that competition may involve excessive duplication, while monopolistic industries may enjoy economies of scale. duplication, while monopolistic industries may enjoy economies of scale.
Realizing that Leibenstein's idea of X-effi ciency represented a serious threat Realizing that Leibenstein's idea of X-effi ciency represented a serious threat to abstract price theory, Stigler (1976) rose to the occasion, pulling out all the to abstract price theory, Stigler (1976) rose to the occasion, pulling out all the stops. In terms of rhetorical success, Stigler's combination of brilliance and bluster stops. In terms of rhetorical success, Stigler's combination of brilliance and bluster mostly carried the day. Although Leibenstein's (1978) response to Stigler was well mostly carried the day. Although Leibenstein's (1978) response to Stigler was well reasoned, it never resonated with many economists. Leibenstein remains undereasoned, it never resonated with many economists. Leibenstein remains undeservedly underappreciated. While some later researchers have followed the trail servedly underappreciated. While some later researchers have followed the trail he blazed for further consideration of motivational and behavioral factors, such he blazed for further consideration of motivational and behavioral factors, such work still has not had any impact on the core theory of economics. In this sense, work still has not had any impact on the core theory of economics. In this sense, Leibenstein's challenge is as relevant today as it ever was. Leibenstein's challenge is as relevant today as it ever was. 
